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COMMENTS
FEDERAL JURISDICTION-CHOICE OF LAW-FEDERAL LAW
OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.
The concept of a federal common law of negotiable instruments,
though not new, has not often been rendered articulate. It may be that
the courts themselves have yet to admit that a problem has been created
by the interaction of the concepts of federal supremacy and the law
merchant. Indeed, the very nomenclature "federal law of negotiable in-
struments" is a deceptive caption and one which affords little warning to
the unwary of the intricate constitutional law problem subsisting just
below the surface of this particular branch of the law merchant. The
purposes of this comment are to demonstrate the existence of such a
problem, to investigate its intricacies and to propose a solution of it.
The problem of the federal common law arose in the now famous
case of Swift v. Tyson.' The command of the Federal Judiciary Act of
1789,2 that the federal courts apply the laws of the several states when
the constitution, treaties, or federal statutes were not involved was in-
terpreted by Mr. Justice Story only to require the federal courts to
apply the statutory laws of the states and not the common law. In
Swift, the central issue was whether an antecedent debt was "value"
so as to make one who took the instrument for such a debt a holder in
due course. The Court refused to apply New York common law to the
matter and instead applied the law of the "commercial world." In 1937,
the Supreme Court overruled Swift v. Tyson by the decision in Erie R.R.
v. Tompkins,3 wherein Justice Brandeis, speaking for the majority of
the Court and interpreting the same statute,4 stated that there was no
federal common law and, that except where the Constitution or a congres-
sional act was involved, the federal courts must apply both the statutory and
the common law of the states.5
The federal district courts acquired jurisdiction in both the Erie
and Swift cases by reason of the diversity of citizenship of the litigants.
1. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
2. Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1959).
3. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
4. Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1959).
5. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
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However, the language of Justice Brandeis was so broad and has been
so widely cited that the bounds of the decision have not yet been defined.
The Erie doctrine has not always been limited to diversity cases and,
thus the federal courts have decided in cases where jurisdiction was not
based upon diversity of citizenship that there was no federal law on the
subject and that state law would apply.6 The basic problem posed by the
question "what is the extent to which the Erie doctrine should be applied ?"
goes to the heart of the federal system and the interaction of state and
federal law.
The scope of this comment, however, encompasses only a small part
of that vast area of conflict aroused by the Erie doctrine, the area of
negotiable instruments as affected by the federal common law. Swift v.
Tyson was interpreted to mean that the federal courts would follow
a federal common law in diversity cases where there was no applicable
state statute; and at the time this decision was rendered, most states
had not enacted comprehensive statutes governing commercial paper. Erie
struck down Swift and, in effect, proclaimed that there was no federal
common law of negotiable instruments and that both the case and
statutory law of the state in which the federal district court sat would
govern such obligations.
But if Swift v. Tyson was dead, its ghost appeared not long after
the crepe had been taken down when the Supreme Court decided Clear-
field Trust Co. v. United States,7 in which it was held that the federal
common law of negotiable instruments should be applied in litigation
involving the federal government as drawer-drawee of a check. Certainly
Swift and Clearfield are factually distinguishable, the former arising out
of the federal court's diversity jurisdiction and the latter out of the
federal court's jurisdiction to hear actions to which the federal govern-
ment is a party. However, the language in the Erie case to the effect that
the federal courts will apply state law except where the Constitution or a
congressional act is involved, squarely presented the Court with the
problem of explaining why it had decided to apply federal law to the
substantive issues where neither the Constitution nor a congressional
act was directly involved.8
But even where federal statutes and federal agencies are involved, a
choice of law problem arises because the application of federal law is
not automatic and, perhaps not constitutionally possible.9 The question
of the choice of law in cases involving federal statutes and federal agencies
which had acquired privately executed commercial paper was suggested
before the Clearfield case but took on a new light after that decision.
6. See Note, 53 COLUm. L. Riv. 991, 999-1000 and cases cited n.51 (1953).
7. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
8. The Court stated that the power to issue the instrument was a constitutional
power and therefore federal law governed. Id. at 366. For a further discussion of
this seemingly weak reasoning see text infra at notes 53-55.
9. See text accompanying note 45, infra.
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In 1940 and 1942 the Court decided cases involving government agencies
and their rights on instruments acquired by them as transferees. 10 In
these cases the Court held that the law of the appropriate state would
not apply to provide defenses on the instruments because federal agencies
had acquired rights on them; that the operation of the government
agencies would be impeded by the application of state law was the ex-
planation given.
Quite simply, the problem is whether, having entered the business
world, the federal government should be treated like a business enterprise
in its commercial activities, or whether it should retain the rights and
privileges of the sovereign. The federal courts, in their decisions, have
emphatically chosen the latter course, but it is yet to be seen whether they
can constitutionally justify such a choice and, even more important,
whether they should have chosen thus. The principle that the sovereign is
not to be treated like other litigants is inherent in the system of all law,
and is as old as the law itself. However, this rationale is seldom rendered,
articulate in cases where the federal law of negotiable instruments is ap-
plied; but, rather the converse of the traditional idea of sovereignty, that
is, that the federal government when dealing in the commercial field is to
be treated the same as anyone else, has constantly been reaffirmed and
reiterated." The very fact that there is a federal law of negotiable in-
struments, however, belies this pious utterance; for if the government is
to be treated no differently than private parties, its rights and obligations
should be governed by state law. In most instances, though, if the law
of the appropriate state were applied, the result would differ from that
reached when the federal law is applied. This paradox will present the
main area of inquiry of this comment.
Analyzing this paradox, we will consider when this federal common
law will be applied, the sources from which this law is derived, and the
effects of having a federal law governing negotiable instruments. These
problems are certainly of great contemporary significance in light of the
tremendous amount of government negotiable paper afloat and the many
commercial fields into which the government has entered, in which fields it
necessarily must deal with commercial paper. It should be noted, however,
that while the areas into which the government has stepped are vast, the
number of reported cases in these areas is quite small. Consequently, the
principles which we can set down must be largely speculative, as they must
be extracted and extended from those laid down in these few cases.
10. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942); Deitrick v. Greany,
309 U.S. 190 (1940).
11. E.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 369 (1943).
[VOL. 6
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I.
WHEN THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS IS APPLIED.
A.
When the Government is Maker of the Instrument.
In 1959, Judge Chambers, speaking for the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit wrote [citing Clearfield], "Of course it is settled that Erie
v. Tompkins does not apply to government commercial paper - it is
purely federal business.1 12 Thus, the federal law of negotiable instruments
is applied. The federal courts, in cases arising since the Clearfield deci-
sion, have uniformly held that where the Government is the maker of the
instrument, and is also involved in the litigation, the federal law of
negotiable instruments will govern. 13 The reasoning behind this, as Mr.
Justice Douglas indicated in the Clearf eld case, is that the authority to
issue checks has its origin in the Constitution and statutes of the United
States. Therefore, when the federal government issues commercial paper,
it does so in the exercise of a constitutional power or function, and such
paper can be in no way dependent upon the law of any state. Thus, federal,
rather than local law should govern.' 4
Another reason stated for applying federal rather than state law,
where the Government is a party to the instrument, is that transactions
involving federal commercial paper will occur in all of the various states,
and if the law of each of these states is to be applied to the particular
transaction, Government obligations will be subject to the uncertainties
and vagaries resulting from divergent rules governing identical trans-
actions. "The desirability of a uniform rule is plain."' 1
The most difficult problem arises, however, when the Court does not
limit the application of federal commercial law to determinations of the
rights of the Government in a particular action, but extends its appli-
12. United States v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. As;'n, 274 F.2d 366,
367 (9th Cir. 1959).
13. E.g., Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29
(1956); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 381 U.S. 363 (1943). The federal
law has been most frequently applied by the federal courts to determine the nature
of the Government obligation, that is, whether Government checks were "order
paper," and, if so, to whose order they were drawn. The cases all involved
"imposter" situations; e.g. National Metropolitan Bank v: United States, 323 U.S.
454 (1945); United States v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 274
F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1959); Atlantic Nat'l Bank v. United States, 250 F.2d 114 (5th
Cir. 1957); United States v. People's Nat'l Bank, 249 F.2d 637 (7th Cir. 1957);
Fulton Nat'l Bank v. United States, 197 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1952); Continental-
American Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 161 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1947), aff'd
per curiam on rehearing, 175 F.2d 271 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 870 (1949);
United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 131 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1942).
14. 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943).
15. Id. at 367.
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cation to determine the "nature of the instrument" in a suit between two
private parties, where the rights and obligations of the Government are
not directly involved.16 Thus, in a suit for conversion of certain ne-
gotiable federal bonds, of which the defendant claimed to be a good faith
transferee, the Court held that whether or not the bonds were overdue
was a matter of federal law. But the issue of "overdueness" had a direct
bearing upon the good faith of the defendant, which issue, the Court
further held, was to be resolved by the application of state law. 17
One apparent effect of uniformly applying federal law to all ques-
tions bearing on the nature and characteristics of a federally issued in-
strument, without regard to who the parties to the controversy are, is
that some of the rights of individuals involved in wholly intrastate trans-
actions with federal paper will be governed by federal law and some of
their rights will be governed by state law. Further, the line of demarcation
between the areas to which state law will be applied and those to which
federal law will be applied is far from clear, even though the Court has
indicated that federal law will be applied to determine the character of the
instrument, e.g., whether it is, at the pertinent time, overdue.'8 Ap-
parently, the reason for so doing is that the nature of the obligation of
the party primarily liable on the instrument, the Government as drawer-
drawee, is dependent upon whether the instrument is overdue ;19 but the
obligation of the party primarily liable is not so much affected by the
timely presentment of a negotiable instrument as are the rights of trans-
ferees and purchasers.2 0 It follows that the effort to make the nature of
federal obligations uniform does have a collateral effect on private parties,
since issues affecting the nature of the instrument are to be determined
by federal law at the same time that the other commercial aspects of the
case are disposed of pursuant to local practices. Granted the interjection
of federal law merchant into otherwise private litigation, the problem
becomes one of distinguishing the hard core of the federal law merchant,
promulgated pursuant to the policy of uniformity, from the balance of the
commercial law, which is only accidental to the dispute, and, therefore
ought to be derived from state sources pursuant to the policy of Erie.
The Court apparently realized the dilemma which it had created, but
in an attempted resolution, it proceeded to further complicate the matter.
The test promulgated to determine whether federal or state law would
govern is whether the matter was "too essentially . . . private" not to be
dealt with by local law.21 However, no practical criteria for determining
when a transaction is "too essentially . . . private" were set up; and
16. Bank of America Natl Trust & Say. A'ss'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29 (1956).
17. Ibid.
18. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 34
(1956).
19. Ibid.
20. See BRIITON, BILLS AND Noui's §§ 188-200 (1943).
21. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 34
(1956).
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although the Court said that the transaction between the litigating parties
in the Parnell case was "too essentially . . . private," federal law was
still applied to the determination of an issue fundamental to the ultimate
resolution of the controversy arising out of this essentially private trans-
action. The contradiction involved in the Court's reasoning is apparent.
And to further confuse the issue, the Court went on to say that just
because they had chosen not to apply the federal law to this transaction -
which was, in fact, what they had actually done - there was no reason
to assume that they could not do so, or to assume that Congress was
foreclosed from legislating in the field.22
In the Clearfield case, the Court did not indicate from which clause in
the Constitution the federal government derives the power to issue checks,
although it is probably from the banking power.23 And more fundamentally,
the Court did not discuss how it bridged the gap between the power to
issue commercial paper and the power to proclaim a federal commercial
law. The question is one of enumerated powers, that is, whether the power
to issue commercial paper includes the power to subject the parties who
become involved with that paper to a federal law. The problem was not so
apparent in the Clearfield case, where the rights of the federal government
were before the Court; but with the Court's application, in the Parnell
case, of federal law to the rights of private parties who happen to enter
into a transaction involving Government paper, the constitutional prob-
lem merits re-examination.
The Federal District Court of Maryland, perhaps leary of the con-
stitutional problem involved, refused to allow the defendants to join prior
endorsers as third party defendants, in a suit by the Government to hold
defendant bank liable on its guarantee of prior endorsements. 24 Following
the lead of the Parnell case, however, the court applied both state and
federal law. Unlike the Supreme Court, though, it only applied state law
to effect the decision as between the private party defendant and private
party endorsers, while federal law was applied to determine the rights
between defendant bank and the federal government.25
B.
When the Federal Government is not the Maker of the Instrument.
It is certainly understandable that most cases in which the federal
common law of negotiable instruments has been invoked are those in
22. Ibid.
23. U.S. CONs5T. art. I, § 8 "Congress shall have the power to . . . pay the debts,
... to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution
the foregoing powers .... "
24. United States v. Fidelity-Baltimore Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 171 F. Supp.
1 (D. Md. 1958).
25. United States v. Fidelity-Baltimore Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 173 F. Supp.
565 (D. Md. 1959). The court applied the state statute of limitations to bar the
bank's recovery against prior endorsers, but allowed the Government to proceed
against the bank under the Clearfield rule.
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which the federal government is a party to the instrument. The practical
reason for this is easily seen, to wit, the Government is probably involved
in more litigation on its own instruments than on those which it acquires
as payee or transferee, because people are, no doubt, less willing to pass
defective or questionable instruments to the federal government. And as
a matter of fact, the cases involving federal law and negotiable instru-
ments of which the Government was not maker, usually arise because
the makers of the instruments did not foresee that the Government would
become involved.
The two major cases involving controversy over negotiable instruments
to which the Government was not a party are not sources of affirmative rea-
sons supporting the application of federal principles, but, rather, provide a
rationale for applying state rules. Both Dietrick v. Greany28 and D'Oench,
Duhme & Co. v. FDIC2T were decided before the Clearfield case, which
was the first pronouncement of the federal law of negotiable instruments.
But since Clearfield, both decisions have taken on a new light.
Both the Dietrick case and the D'Oench, Duhme case involved suits
against accommodation makers of notes. These accommodation makers at-
tempted to set up defenses to their liability - defenses which were
valid under the rule of law of the appropriate state - but the Supreme
Court held that federal policy prevented assertion of these defenses.
In Dietrick v. Greany, petitioner, director of a bank, executed a note
to the bank to cover a transaction made illegal by the National Bank Act of
1864.28 Respondent, receiver for the subsequently insolvent bank, sued
on the instrument. The Court stated that the federal statute.29 which
made it a crime to impair the capital of a bank and thereby injure
the creditors in the event of insolvency, 0 was part of a complete scheme of
congressional legislation to protect national banks. But the "extent and
nature of the legal consequences of this condemnation" of respondent's
unlawful act "was left by the statute to judicial determination"' 1 in line
with the policy which Congress had adopted.8 2 The Court then held that
one of the "legal consequences" was that the receiver could recover on the
note, notwithstanding the fact that there were available defenses to
liability under the law of the state of Massachusetts. Federal law was
applied by reason of Congress's provision for a comprehensive scheme of
legislation covering national banks88 notwithstanding the fact that the
congressional purpose was not shown to have been thwarted by re-
26. 309 U.S. 190 (1940).
27. 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
28. NATIONAL BANK AcT, 13 Stat. 110 (1864), 12 U.S.C. § 83 (1959).
29. 40 Stat. 972 (1918), repealed, 62 Stat. 862 (1948).
30. 309 U.S. 190, 194 (1940). The Court indicates that this is the purpose of
the statute.
31. Id. at 200.
32. Id. at 201.
33. Dietrick v. Greany, 309 U.S. 190 (1940).
[VOL. 6
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spondent's act, that is, there was no showing that the creditors of the
bank were in any way affected. 34
The principles of the Dietrick case were further extended by the
D'Oench case, which held that even though petitioner, accommodation
maker of a note executed to allow a bank to carry the note on its books
in lieu of worthless bonds, did not commit a crime by this act, the policy
of the Federal Reserve Act3 5 to protect the FDIC and the public funds
which it administered precluded the application of state law on the issue
of whether respondent was a holder in due course. Federal law was ap-
plied so as to make the defense of holder in due course unavailable, not-
withstanding the fact that the purpose of the act to protect creditors of the
bank from deceit or injury, as in the Dietrick case, was not thwarted.3 6
At first glance, it would not seem unreasonable to make allowance for
a federal policy overriding the law of a state where the two might con-
flict. When the nature and purpose of negotiable instruments law is
considered, however, i.e., to facilitate the free flow of commerce within
the workings of the commercial world which requires a complex credit
system, it would seem more reasonable to subject the federal agency's
dealings in commerce to the rules of the commercial world rather than to
subject the commercial world to the particular rules governing the opera-
tions of the federal agency.
Since the Clearfield case at least one court, the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, T has refused to apply the state law of negotiable
instruments to a case involving a government corporation, and has ap-
plied the federal law of negotiable instruments.3 8 The reasoning of the
Clearfield case with respect to the uniformity of government obligations
was adopted and extended, the court reasoning that "such agencies being
national in their scope and aim, shall not be forced to shape their trans-
actions to conform to the varying laws of the places where they occur
or are to be carried out. Uniformity is thought to be essential to the
convenient and speedy dispatch of their operations. '3 9
Thus it would seem that one might expect the courts to apply
federal law to all negotiable instruments problems when a government
corporation is a party to the litigation. Judge Learned Hand, in New
York, N.H. & H.R.R. v. RFC,40 wrote, "Recent decisions of the Supreme
Court [citing Dietrick v. Greany and D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC,
among others] make it apparent that state statutes and state decisions
are an unsafe reliance in dealing with the rights and liabilities of
corporations which are federal agencies even though they be organized
34. Id. at 198.
35. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 385 U.S. 442, 459 (1942).
36. Id. at 461.
37. New York, N.H. & H.R.R. v. RFC, 180 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1950).
38. Ibid.
39. Id. at 244.
40. 180 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1950).
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under a state law and made subject to suit like a private corporation. '41
Further, from the cases outlined in the previous section and those fore-
mentioned in this section the conclusion is inescapable that the federal
law of negotiable instruments can be extended to cover all negotiable
instruments problems in which the Government is at all involved. For
it can certainly be argued that in almost any field in which the Govern-
ment or a federal agency so acts as to become involved with commercial
paper, either as maker, payee, holder or transferee, there has been some
congressional legislative scheme enabling it to so act; and in its actions
it is entitled to the protection of a uniform rule. Thus, the federal law of
negotiable instruments should apply.
II.
CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW.
The Supremacy clause of the Constitution42 provides that the laws
made in pursuance of the Constitution will be the supreme law of the
land and that the judges of the courts of every state will be bound thereby,
anything in the constitutions and laws of the states to the contrary not-
withstanding. Thus it would seem that the state courts are bound to
apply the federal common law of negotiable instruments whenever it is
applicable, that is, when the Government is the maker of the instrument
and the nature or characteristics of the instrument are at issue 43 or when
the Government or a federal agency is party to the suit.44 When the
federal government is a party to the litigation, the suit will be brought in
the federal courts, and the federal courts have had no difficulty applying
the federal law. When a federal statute,45 however, permits a federal
corporation to be sued in a state court or where the nature of a federal
instrument is at issue in a suit between private parties in a state court,
there is bound to be some difficulty in applying federal law. The state
courts, naturally jealous of their jurisdiction and the applicability of the
law of the forum, may be understandably slow in exchanging the cer-
tainty of the negotiable instruments law of their state for the uncer-
tainty of the federal law.46 Furthermore, the extent to which the federal law
is applicable, though conceivably to all of the issues in the particular case, 47
is really quite uncertain. In Bank of America Nat'I Trust & Say. Ass'n
v. Parnell,48 the Supreme Court, sitting by reason of diversity jurisdiction
and thus as if on appeal from a state court, applied both federal and state
law, using the question of whether the transaction was essentially local
41. Id. at 244.
42. U.S. CoNs'r. art. VI.
43. See cases cited at note 13, supra.
44. See text at note 13, supra.
45. E.g., Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 264(j) (1959).
46. See text following note 68, infra.
47. See text at note 16, supra.
48. 352 U.S. 29 (1956).
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to determine to which issues state or federal law should be applied.49
But the Federal District Court of Maryland refused to apply federal
law to a suit between private parties on a Government check, 50 and
state courts have refused to apply federal law to determine the nature
and effect of Government paper. 51
The Erie doctrine, though, denies the existence and constitutionality
of a federal common law. Mr. Justice Brandeis, speaking for the
majority of the Court in Erie, said, "Congress has no power to declare sub-
stantive rules of common law applicable in a State whether they be local in
their nature or 'general,' be they commercial law or a part of the law of
torts. And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power
upon the federal courts. ' 52 Mr. justice Field, in Baltimore & O.R.R. v.
Baugh,53 said:
I am aware that what has been termed the general law of the
country - which is often little less than what the judge advancing the
doctrine thinks at the time should be the general law on a particular
subject - has been often advanced in judicial opinions of this court
to control a conflicting law of the state .... But, notwithstanding the
great names which may be cited in favor of the doctrine, and not-
withstanding the frequency with which the doctrine has been reiterated,
there stands, as a perpetual protest against its repetition, the Constitu-
tion of the United States, which recognizes and preserves the
autonomy and independence of the States - independence in their
legislative and independence in their judicial departments. Supervision
over either the legislative or the judicial action of the States is in no
case permissible except as to matters by the Constitution specially au-
thorized or delegated to the United States. Any interference with
either, except as thus permitted, is an invasion of the authority of
the State, and, to that extent, a denial of its independence.
The constitutional problem can thus be characterized as a con-
flict between the operation of the supremacy clause and the possible non-
-existence of a constitutional power in the federal government to regu-
late transactions in commercial paper. In the Clearfteld case, the Supreme
'Court summarily pronounced, without discussion, that when an instru-
ment is issu 2d by the government under its constitutional power, rights
,on the instrument are governed by federal law. But that case directly
49. See text at note 21, supra.
50. United States v. Fidelity-Baltimore Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 171 F. Supp.
1 (D. Md. 1958).
51. McCollum v. Graber, 207 Ark. 1053, 184 S.W.2d 264 (1945); McMurray
v. Rhode Island, Inc., 117 A.2d 114 (Munic. Ct. App. D.C. 1955); Crawford v.
Alatex Constr. Serv., Inc., 120 So. 2d 845 (La. 1960). See also Stone & Webster
Engineer Corp. v. Hamilton Nat'l Bank, 199 F.2d 127 (6th Cir. 1952) ; United States
-v. Arnold and S. Bleichroeder, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
52. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
53. 149 U.S. 368, 401 (1893).
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involved the rights of the Government as drawer-drawee-plaintiff in a
suit in a federal court to recover on the defendant's guarantee of prior
endorsements. The rights of private parties were not discussed; but
the Parnell case, in effect, applied the federal law to the rights of private
parties in a suit arising on a Government check, citing Clearfield, but
without discussing the constitutional power to do so. It, no doubt, could
be argued that the power to issue the instrument includes the power to
fashion the rules of law governing it,54 but query whether the banking
power is so all embracing. Alternatively, it has been argued that the inter-
pretation of the commerce clause may be enlarged so as to permit federal
regulation of all negotiable instruments,55 but this has not yet been done.
It is submitted that such an interpretation would do much to put the
cases in which the federal law has been applied by reason of the fact that
a federal corporation was involved56 on a sounder constitutional footing.
In the cases decided before Clearfield the basis for the application of
federal law would seem to be the constitutional power of the Government
to create agencies. But even more questionable than the idea that the
banking power includes the power to subject transactions between private
parties involving Government paper to federal regulation is the idea
that the power to create agencies includes the power to subject the rights
of parties to commercial paper, with which the agency subsequently be-
comes involved, to the federal law. Again, the panacea would seem to be
expansion of the area of applicability of the commerce clause. Although
this solution would apply only to instruments affecting interstate com-
merce, almost all the commercial paper afloat could conceivably satisfy this
criterion.
III.
SOURCES OF THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.
Once the courts have decided that federal common law applies, as
they have in an undefined area of the law of negotiable instruments, they
are faced with the problem of where to find it. There is no extensive
compilation of federal cases in the area of negotiable instruments and
other areas of the law not dealing with the Constitution, treaties, or
federal statutes, simply because these areas have been traditionally within
the domain of the state courts. Since the Erie case held that state law,
as such, is to be applied in diversity cases, no federal common law has
54. See Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 34(1956).
55. Dean, Conflict of Laws Under The Uniform Commercial Code: The Case For
Federal Enactment, 6 VAND. L. Rv. 479 (1953).
56. E.g., D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942); Dietrick v.
Greany, 309 U.S.190 (1940); New York, N..H. & H.R.R. v. RFC, 180 F.2d 241(2d Cir. 1950).
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arisen from these cases. Because of this lack of a comprehensive source
of federal common law, some judges" have chosen to call what they apply
the general common law rather than the federal common law. This change
of appellation does nothing to alleviate the problem, however. The federal
rule is drawn from the general common law, but from whence comes this
general common law? The sources are many.
In the Clearfield case, Mr. Justice Douglas stated that although the
law that developed under Swift v. Tyson was a general common law
rather than a federal rule, the law of these cases would be a convenient
source from which the federal courts might fashion the federal rules. 8
A path that follows the cases decided under Swift v. Tyson as a source of
the federal law might well be questioned. At the time of Swift and
kindred cases the law merchant, the "law of the commercial world,"5 9 was
to be found only in decided cases. Since the beginning of the twentieth
century, however, all of the states have adopted the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Law and five states have now abandoned it in favor of the
Uniform Commercial Code. The specific intention in enacting such uni-
form laws has been to clear up the vagaries and uncertainties of the law
merchant.60 Doubtless the uniform acts embody a great deal of the
law merchant; but doubtless too, they change much of it and render more
certain pronouncements upon situations previously left unsolved by the
law merchant. Conseqhently, to look to the law merchant rather than the
uniform acts to determine the federal law would seem to be a step back-
ward, particularly in view of the fact that the laws of the various states
are, for the most part, uniform in the field of negotiable instruments.
Of course, the laws of the various states,6' including the com-
prehensive statutes,6 2 have not been entirely overlooked as sources of the
federal law. Even in Clearfield, the Court admitted that federal courts
-occasionally have taken their rule from the law of a state.63 The basis,
however, for determining from what source or sources the courts will
draw the rule when the federal law of negotiable instruments is applicable
has never been articulated. Hence the rights of the parties to negotiable
instruments is doubly uncertain. Not only is it unclear when the courts
will apply the federal common law; but once they decide that it controls,
one knows not from whence it might come. Perhaps the most accurate
57. E.g., Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), which the Court in
Clearfield cites as one of the sources of the federal law. Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943).
58. Ibid.
59. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 19 (1842).
60. See BgUTZL'S BRANNAN NSOIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 73 (7th ed. 1948);
BRITrON, BILLS AND NonTs 19 (1943). See generally, BEUmtL's BRANNAN, supra
1-109; BRITTON, supra pp. 1-22. However, while the UNIFORM NZeGOIABLE INSTRU-
MENTS LAW brought about a great deal more certainty, uncertainties and conflicts of
interpretation still exist. No doubt this is the reason for the proposal of the
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE.
61. See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 381 U.S. 363, 367 (1943).
62. See New York, N.H. & H.R.R. v. RFC, 180 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1950).
63. 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943).
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indication of the source of this federal law was articulated by Mr. Justice
Jackson when he said that the courts will consider the aforementioned
sources but ultimately will make up their own rule.6 4 No doubt this is what
every court does when it is presented with a problem of first impression
and upon which the legislature has not spoken. This is unnecessary,
however, in the field of negotiable instruments because the law has been
codified by comprehensive statutes which cover most of the problems.
Why then exchange relative certainty for almost total uncertainty?
IV.
THE EFFECT OF HAVING A FEDERAL LAW OF
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.
The effects of having a federal commercial law are difficult to
discern because the very fact that we have such a "body of law" has hardly
been realized. But if the courts follow the current trend - and it is not
yet certain that they will6 5 - the commercial world will experience a rude
awakening. Among the current problems, however, is the fact that the
areas of the law of negotiable instruments which have been passed upon
since the Clearfield case are quite narrow. Because of the limited number
of issues covered, there is, necessarily, a great deal of uncertainty in the
areas which have not yet been covered, uncertainty both as to whether
federal law will be applied and uncertainty as to what the rule will be
in the event it is applied. It is not difficult to conceive of a conflict of
federal interests which might cast even more doubt upon whether the
federal law should be applied in certain areas. For example, suppose
that as a result of the decision in the Clearfield case a bank which handled
a great many Government checks set up a large reserve to protect itself
against possible losses on Government instruments. The Commissioner
of Internal Revenue would very likely disallow such a large reserve, leaving
the bank in a rather undesirable position.
Another effect of the federal common law of negotiable instruments
is that under the federal law the Government may recover in an action
on an instrument while the losing party's recourse against the others has
already been foreclosed by state law. 66 The fact that the application of
the federal law of negotiable instruments depends upon the identity of
64. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 469 (1942) (concurring
opinion). See United States v. Cambridge Trust Co., No. 60-310-W, 1st Cir.,
Mar. 24, 1961.
65. See Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 35
(1956) (dissenting opinion of Justices Black and Douglas).
66. This problem was pointed up in Fulton Nat'l Bank v. United States, 197 F.2d
763 (5th Cir. 1952) (dissenting opinion of Rives, J.). Justice Rives stated that the
federal rule, as announced in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 370,(1943), was that the United States could recover if the guarantor of prior endorse-
ments was not damaged by the operation of the federal rule. However, in the Fulton
case, the hapless guarantor was barred by state law. See also, United States v.
Fidelity-Baltimore Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 173 F. Supp. 565 (D. Md. 1959).
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the parties to the litigation necessarily undermines the stability of the
commercial paper involved. And it is of prime importance that the
rights of parties to commercial paper be certain, for the use of such
paper is vital to the commercial world. It has been said that ninety per
cent of all business transactions in the United States are settled by
check. 67
Of course there is another problem that may arise with the advent of
the federal law of negotiable instruments, namely the maintenance of
uniformity. It is certainly not inconceivable, due to the indefiniteness of
the areas in which the law will be applied and the numerous and undefined
sources from which it may be drawn, that as to questions yet unsettled
there will be diverse results among the circuits The resolution of
these diverse results will place a heavy burden upon the Supreme Court68
and prevent the Court from handling more important constitutional
problems.
An analogous problem arises when the question of state court appli-
cation of federal law is considered. Apparently the power of the federal
government to have its own law of negotiable instruments in order to
protect the uniformity of government obligations has never been chal-
lenged. The same policies which make federal law applicable in federal
courts should also make it applicable in state courts, so theoretically the
states should apply the federal law of negotiable instruments in certain
areas, areas in which federal law may conflict with the law of the
state. However, just what areas of the traditional jurisdiction of the
states can be constitutionally invaded by the federal law has not been
determined. Furthermore, the chances of maintaining uniformity in the
law of government obligations will not be enhanced by fifty different states
articulating their various opinions on what the substance of the spectral
federal law is.
V.
CONCLUSION.
The Clearfield case and its successors have created a problem of
uncertainty in the field of commercial paper. There is an indefinite num-
ber of commercial transactions which is governed by an even more
indefinite body of principles. The entire problem arose out of the Clearfield
case which simply allowed the Government to recover on a cause of action
which, had the plaintiff been a private party, would have been barred by
plaintiff's failure to give timely notice of a forgery. Thus, the whole
problem might have been avoided had the Court employed the principle
of judicial restraint and limited its decision to a holding that the failure
67. BRITTON, BILLS AND NoTzs 1 (1943).
68. Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law", 105 U. PA. L. Rev. 797, 818
(1957).
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to give timely notice of a forgery does not operate to bar the sovereign's
recovery; but instead it proclaimed that there was a body of substantive
law applicable to Government commercial paper.6 9 Subsequently, as it
has been seen, this concept of a federal law of negotiable instruments has
been expanded to include suits between private parties on government
instruments, in which suits some of the rights of the parties are governed
by the federal law and others are governed by state law. The "uncertainties
which inhere in such a dichotomy" of applicable law, as evidenced by the
decision in the Parnell case, "are obvious." TO The solution of the problem
may require an abandonment of the principle of uniformity of Government
obligations, but it would bring about a greater certainty. And if that is
necessary, "the business of the United States will go on without that
uniformity."71
The underlying question is one of choice of law, and this problem
exists in the entire field of negotiable instruments. Although some
conflicts among the states have arisen concerning choice of law, the
interstate problem is not acute because of the wide enactment of the
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act. 72 On the federal level a compre-
hensive choice of law rule could obviate the entire problem of the
federal common law.
The merit of this solution consists largely of the relative simpli-
city of devising a choice of law rule as compared to the formulation of an
entire body of federal substantive law of negotiable instruments. 3 Such
a comprehensive rule for choice of law in the field of negotiable instru-
ments has been proposed ;74 and, in fact, before the Clearfield case, the
Supreme Court had decided the rights and obligations of the federal
government in negotiable instruments cases under conflicts of law
principles. 75 These cases have never been overruled, and perhaps the
Clearfield case should be limited, as heretofore indicated, and the solution
of the problem created by it effectuated by adoption of a definite body of
choice of law rules. The solution, of course, presupposes the rejection
69. There is no doubt that the Government could have recovered under the
UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW §§ 65-66, but for the delay in notice.
See BRITTrON, BILLS AND NOTr.S § 138 (1943).
70. Bank of America Nat'l Trust and Say. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 35(1956) (dissenting opinion, of Justices Black and Douglas).
71. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 35(1956) (dissenting opinion of Justices Black and Douglas).
72. Mishkin, supra note 67, at 828.
73. Id. at 813.
74. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-105 (1952). Dean, supra note 54. UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-105 (1958).
75. United States v. Guaranty Trust Co., 293 U.S. 340 (1934). The Court held
that the law of Yugoslavia governed a Government check which was sent to the
payee in Yugoslavia. The Court reasoned that the validity of the transfer of the
bill, which was subsequently brought inTo this country with the consent of the owner,
is governed by the law of the place where the transfer occurred. The Guaranty Trust
case was subsequently cited as authority by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit for the proposition that, in a suit by the United States Government on
a Government issued check, Oklahoma law would apply. United States v. First Nat'l
Bank of Prague, 124 F.2d 484 (10th cir. 1941).
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by the Court of the policy of treating the federal government, in its
commercial activities, "the same" as a private business enterprise. In addi-
tion, it does not relieve the disquieting problem of having the rights and
obligations of the federal government determined by the laws of fifty
different states.
A solution of this last problem could be effected by the enactment of
a comprehensive federal statute and articulation of the constitutional justi-
fication therefor. Perhaps the decisions of the Supreme Court in the
Clearfield and Parnell cases were intended as advisory directives to Con-
gress to act within this area. In Parnell, the majority of the Court made
clear its opinion that Congress had the power to legislate in this area,76
and the dissenting opinion pointed up the need for a solution to the prob-
lem. 77 The Uniform Commercial Code certainly merits attention in the
matter as the increasing consideration which it is being given by almost
every state legislature indicates. Further, its enactment by Congress would
almost certainly bring about an epidemic of positive legislative action within
the states. Thus, the desired uniformity, not only of federal rights but of
all commercial paper, would be promoted, at least within the United States.
And most important, the uncertainty which has plagued this field would
be eliminated. 78
The likelihood that such an enactment would also provide special
rules for transactions in Government paper is considerable because it is
often difficult, and even impossible, to separate the governmental func-
tions from the business functions of the sovereign. For example, drawing
a check on a federal reserve bank to pay an income tax refund is both
a governmental and a business function. If it should be found necessary to
treat the Government differently from private enterprises, parties dealing
with the Government will at least be apprised of this fact, because the
areas in which the Government is to be treated differently will be clearly
set out. Thus, the primary functions of negotiable instruments law,
certainty and uniformity among equals, will be effectuated.
Robert E. Slota
76. Bank of America Natl Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 34(1956).
77. Id. at 35 (dissenting opinion).
78. See Currie, Federalism and the Admiralty: "The Devil's Own Mess," in
KURLAND, THs SUPREME COURT R vimw 158, 160 (1960).
COMMENTS
16
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 3 [1961], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol6/iss3/4
